The tribunal stressed that any discomfort arising from the fact that a court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction and therefore does not have jurisdiction to decide the issue if there is indeed no arbitration agreement must be ignored. It says: “After accepting and implementing the principle of `competence` for so many years, we must ignore this malaise. Otherwise, we will be able to make increasingly subtle distinctions between situations where the principle applies and situations where it does not. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that the parties had agreed on Bhubaneshwar as the “jurisdiction” for the arbitration. The intention of the parties was therefore to exclude the jurisdiction of all other courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Madras Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the jurisdiction provided for in section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996. Instead, the Tribunal decided that the preferred approach in Singapore was that the party requesting the stay of the proceedings under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the ILO only had to prove on a first sight that the arbitration agreement had been concluded. If there is a case of first instance, the case would be left to the arbitral tribunal to decide itself. By a 5-4 vote, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an arbitration agreement that was unclear as to the availability of class arbitrations would not provide sufficient consent to submit a dispute to class arbitration within the FAA. The court recognized that class arbitration was fundamentally different from FAA-protected individualized arbitration. As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circle`s decision, thus dismissing the Ninth Circle`s petition for the doctrine of interpretation of the California Treaty, which expresses ambiguities against its author, on the grounds that such a doctrine was actually anticipated by the federal FAA.
The Extended Saga of the Execution of icc`s 2015 Commercial Arbitration at Devas v. Antrix (ICC Case No. 18051/ CYK of 2011) raised not only some interesting questions regarding pathological arbitration agreements, but also the ineffectiveness of the “negative effect” of the possible jurisdiction-jurisdiction doctrine. It was arbitrator Woods` behavior that was fatal to the final award. According to the court, the insurance company`s plaintiff spoke with Woods before Woods was chosen as arbitrator, and the fact that this conversation took place was only announced during the court proceedings after the arbitration. In addition, Woods conducted his own investigation into the damage, which is not exceptional in itself.Leave a reply