Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights (Trips Agreement) (1994)

TRIPS conditions that impose more standards beyond TRIPS were also discussed. [38] These free trade agreements contain conditions that limit the ability of governments to create competition for generic drug manufacturers. In particular, the United States has been criticized for encouraging protection far beyond the standards imposed by TRIPS. U.S. free trade agreements with Australia, Morocco, and Bahrain have extended patentability by requiring patents to be available for new uses of known products. [39] The TRIPS Agreement allows for the issuance of compulsory licences at the discretion of a country. The more ad hoc conditions provided for in the free trade agreements between the United States and Australia, Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam have limited the application of compulsory licenses to emergency situations, antitrust measures and cases of non-commercial public use. [39] The TRIPS Convention contains, by reference, the copyright provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Article 9), with the exception of intellectual property rights. It also referred to the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property (Article 2(1)). The TRIPS Agreement explicitly mentions that software and databases are protected by copyright, subject to the requirement of originality (Article 10). Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti[34] argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of generating and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its proponents. This has been supported by the United Nations` findings, which indicate that many low-protection countries currently benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).

[35] Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (during which the patent term of medicines was extended by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged. [36] In contrast, Jörg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017) [37] find historical evidence that, in certain circumstances, compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening intellectual property rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can indeed be effective in promoting inventions by increasing the threat of competition in areas with low reservations. They argue, however, that the benefits of weakening intellectual property rights depend heavily on the credible ability of governments to use them only in exceptional emergencies, given that companies can invest less in research and development while expecting repeated episodes of compulsory licensing. . . .

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